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The Principle of Effectiveness, Competition Law Remedies and the 
Limits of Adjudication 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
Abstract 
The principle of effectiveness is closely related to the development of the emerging 
EU law on remedies. Its instrumental use has enabled the EU courts to restrict the 
principle of national procedural autonomy, when this was convenient in order to 
ensure the accomplishment of the aims set by EU competition law enforcement, and 
to establish EU-granted remedies, the most notable one being the right to claim 
competition law damages. The principle of effectiveness may also influence the 
design of injunctive relief by the European Commission, which should be adequate to 
ensure not only that the results of the violation of competition law are reversed, but 
also that there is no risk that the aims of competition law will be jeopardized in the 
future (general deterrence, specific deterrence and prophylactic/preventive aims). 
Left unbound, the principle of effectiveness may offer the opportunity to competition 
authorities to expand their remedial discretion and to re-design market processes 
and outcomes in accordance with the dominant interpretation of their statutory 
objectives.  
The point made in this paper is that, whatever one thinks of the appropriateness of 
an expansive view of remedial discretion, which is not, in our view, supported by the 
restrictive interpretation of the principle of effectiveness in EU law, remedial 
discretion is naturally limited by the specific function exercised by the remedial 
process chosen or, more contentiously, imposed by the nature of the dispute. 
Drawing on Fuller’s account of the existence of various forms of social ordering, each 
of them emerging in specific circumstances/context and having its own principles and 
limitations, the paper offers some reflections on the possible limits that the essence 
of each ideal type of social ordering sets to the expansive interpretative potential of 
the principle of remedial effectiveness.  
The polycentric nature of competition law disputes calls for flexibility in the choice of 
the adequate form of social ordering aiming to achieve the objectives set by the 
legislator. This breaks with the classic view of the adjudication model and hints to the 
prevalence, in a significant number of cases with a pronounced polycentric element, 
of what has been called the “structural adjudication” model, still distinct from the 
model of regulatory governance. The paper explores the nature of commitment 
decisions as an illustration of the difficulties of classification, without a proper 
consideration of the functions and respective limits of each form of social ordering. It 
does this by examining some recent cases, such as the ongoing Google saga at the 
European Commission or the Skyscanner judgment of the UK Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT). 
Keywords: effectiveness, remedies, competition law, commitments, adjudication, 
regulation, participation, procedure  
JEL Classification: K21, K40, K41, L40   
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The Principle of Effectiveness, Competition Law Remedies and the 
Limits of Adjudication 
 
Ioannis Lianos1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The principle of effectiveness is closely related to the development of the 
emerging EU law on remedies. Its instrumental use has enabled the EU 
courts to restrict the principle of national procedural autonomy, when this was 
convenient in order to ensure the accomplishment of the aims set by EU 
competition law enforcement, and to establish EU-granted remedies, the most 
notable one being the right to claim competition law damages. The principle of 
effectiveness may also influence the design of injunctive relief by the 
European Commission, which should be adequate to ensure not only that the 
results of the violation of competition law are reversed, but also that there is 
no risk that the aims of the competition law enforced will be jeopardized in the 
future (general deterrence, specific deterrence and prophylactic/preventive 
aims)2. The principle of effectiveness may therefore reinforce the remedial 
discretion of the Commission and national competition authorities when 
implementing EU competition law. Discretion to adopt effective remedies 
cannot, however, be unlimited.  
 
There are various forces that may operate in order to keep it in check. First, 
due process rights and fundamental rights jurisprudence, following the 
conferral of a binding effect to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
expected integration of the EU in the ECHR system may balance the need for 
effective, read expansive, remedies and therefore limit the risk of discretionary 
remedialism3. Second, well-established conceptions in private and public law 
about the inherent limits of the remedial exercise may also exercise 
constraints to the remedial discretion of the Commission and other 
competition authorities: the principle of proportionality, for public law, or the 
correlativity of private law disputes cannot accommodate fully the demands of 
optimal enforcement theory for deterrence. For instance, remedies should fit 
the competition law problem identified at the liability stage and the theory of 
harm the decision-maker relied upon in order to find the defendant liable for 
the competition law infringement4.  
                                                          
1
 Professor of Global Competition Law and Policy, UCL Faculty of Laws; Director, Centre for 
Law, Economics and Society, UCL Faculty of Laws; Leading Research Fellow, National 
Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Alexander von Humboldt 
Research Fellow, WZB Berlin. The author acknowledges the support of the Leverhulme Trust. 
2
 I. Lianos, Competition law remedies in Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?, in I. 
Lianos, & D. Geradin (eds.), Handbook of EU Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure 
(Edward Elgar, 2013), 362-455, 379-380. 
3
 “Discretionary remedialism” is the view that courts and competition authorities have 
discretion to award the “appropriate” or “optimal” remedy in the circumstances of each 
individual case rather than being limited to specific (perhaps historically determined) remedies 
for each category of causative events. What is optimal is in these cases decided according to 
the interests and aims of the decision-maker. 
4
 For analysis of these limits to discretionary remedialism and the need for remedial discretion 
to be compatible with established legal conceptions of remedies, see I. Lianos, Competition 
law remedies in Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?, in I. Lianos, & D. Geradin 
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This chapter explores a further limit to remedial discretion, that of the 
legitimacy of decision-makers. Legitimacy in this context does not only relate 
to the fact that public action should be legitimate from a legal perspective, that 
is, not illegal. Because of its potential for generating expansive remedies, the 
principle of effectiveness may render this purely legal limit ineffectual. 
Legitimacy, in this context, refers to the specific legitimacy-building 
mechanisms elaborated by the specific social order in order to guarantee that 
its action is politically acceptable by those to which a remedy will be imposed. 
As different social order systems dispose of different mechanisms to 
guarantee the legitimacy of their action, it is important to guarantee that the 
use of the powers conferred to each system corresponds to the specific 
functions exercised by it and do not expand to the realm/functions exercised 
by other forms of social ordering, which dispose their own legitimacy-
generating mechanisms. If such trespass occurs, it may create a legitimacy 
crisis. In the event of a trespass, the decision-maker should therefore emulate 
the legitimacy-building tools of the social order whose boundaries were 
crossed in order to guarantee the legitimacy of its action. More concretely, it is 
argued in this Chapter that remedial discretion is an instance of adjudication 
and, as such, it is subject to the inherent limits of adjudication, as a separate 
form of social ordering from those of contracts/negotiation, 
managerial/administrative discretion or legislation5. Should remedial discretion 
move beyond the limits of adjudication and cross over the “territory” of 
regulation or contractual governance, the decision-maker should adapt, by 
developing legitimacy-building tools that would emulate those used in the 
context of these other forms of social ordering. The participation in the 
remedial process of the interests affected constitutes an important source of 
legitimacy for managerial/administrative discretion6. Consequently, if 
competition law remedies move closer to regulatory ones and therefore cross 
the limits of adjudication, they should give rise to increased participatory rights 
of the interests affected, including interests others than the parties to the 
dispute. 
 
I explore the interaction between the principle of effectiveness and remedial 
discretion, before exploring how the limits of adjudication may be crossed 
over by the remedial action of competition authorities, in view of the 
polycentric dimension of competition law disputes. I then criticize in the 
following section the narrow view of adjudication and advance a distinction 
between the dispute resolution adjudication model and the structural 
adjudication model, the latter being closer to the managerial or administrative 
discretion form of social ordering and thus conducive to resolving polycentric 
disputes. The final part reflects on the emergence of the “consensual” model 
of competition law enforcement, with the development of the practice of 
commitment decisions. I argue that, contrary to what has been thought so far, 
commitment decisions do not constitute a contractual form of social ordering 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(eds.), Handbook of EU Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure (Edward Elgar, 2013), 
362-455. 
5
 L, Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, (1078) 92(2) Harvard Law Review 353-409. 
6
 J.A. Henderson, Comment: Settlement Class Actions and The Limits of Adjudication, (1994-
1995) 80 Cornell L. Rev 1011-1021, 1016, noting that “(e)ach problem-solving process has its 
own source of legitimation”. 
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but present characteristics similar to the structural adjudication model. In 
addition to being theoretically a more accurate description of the reality of 
such remedial practice, the re-conceptualization of commitment decisions as 
a form of structural adjudication should enable the integration of legitimacy-
building mechanisms emulating those of the managerial or administrative 
discretion model, such as increased participation of all interests affected by 
the remedy in the decision-making process. 
 
II. The principle of effectiveness and remedial discretion 
 
For a long time the topic of remedies has been the focus of EU constitutional 
scholars researching on national procedural autonomy and its limitations by 
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. In particular the principle of 
effectiveness has been expansively interpreted by the European judiciary to 
encompass all forms of remedial action for infringements of EU law, and was 
constitutionalized with the adoption of Article 47(1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the EU (hereinafter: Charter) and Article 19(1) 
sentence 2 TEU7. This has led to the development of the emerging field of EU 
remedies law and has had important implications in the enforcement of EU 
competition law. Norbert Reich has described the development of the principle 
of effectiveness in the case law of the CJEU as following three distinctive 
approaches8:  
 
 The principle of effectiveness has initially been understood as an 
“elimination rule”, enabling national courts to put aside or dis-apply 
national provisions making the implementation of EU rights “practically 
impossible” or “excessively difficult” or to interpret the national remedy in 
conformity with EU Law. The jurisprudence of the European Courts 
requires Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and 
procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective protection of 
individuals’ rights under EU law, and hence put in place effective remedies 
for violations of EU law. When adjudicating the protection of EU rights in 
private legal disputes, the CJEU has mostly relied on its ‘effectiveness and 
equivalence’ test to assess national procedures, “effectiveness” referring 
to the requirement that national procedural rules should not make the 
enforcement of EU rights impossible or excessively difficult.. 
 
 The second step in the development of the principle of effectiveness is its 
“use as ‘hermeneutical’ i.e. interpretative principle”. This provides some 
positive content to the principle of effectiveness, requiring Member States 
to provide for remedies “sufficient” to ensure the protection of EU granted 
rights. This involves a two-steps approach from national courts: first to 
spell out the EU right which must be protected by an adequate remedy; 
second, the development of a minimum core of what consists an effective 
                                                          
7
 According to Article 19(1), remedies should be “sufficient to ensure effective legal protection 
in the fields covered by Union law”. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides 
for a right to an effective remedy and effective judicial protection.  
8
 N. Reich, The Principle of Effectiveness and EU Private Law, in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot, F. 
Schulyok (eds.) General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2013), 301-326. 
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or “sufficient” remedy to ensure the protection of the EU granted right. For 
instance, in Manfredi, the CJEU held that  
 
“the full effectiveness of Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) and, in 
particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 
81(1) EC would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to 
claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct 
liable to restrict or distort competition […] As to the award of damages 
and the possibility of an award of punitive damages […] it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to set the criteria for 
determining the extent of the damages, provided that the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are observed […] it follows from the 
principle of effectiveness and the right of any individual to seek 
compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to 
restrict or distort competition that injured persons must be able to seek 
compensation not only for actual loss (damnum emergens) but also for 
loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus interest”9.  
 
As it transpires from the above excerpt, the CJEU first refers to the 
principle of effectiveness (“effet utile”)  in order to recognize an EU-granted 
right for any individual harmed by a competition law infringement to claim 
damages for the loss caused by the infringement (the EU right of 
compensation), before elaborating on the corresponding remedy for that 
right, the award of damages, which should at least ensure (the minimum 
core) that the injured person may receive compensation for the 
abovementioned heads of damages. In essence, the procedural 
dimension, which, in theory, is left to the national level, is subject to the 
interpretation of the EU law granted right, and its scope, as this is 
determined by the CJEU at the EU level. There have been attempts to 
enlarge this minimum core with additional requirements to be imposed to 
the national level as to the development of adequate remedies. For 
instance, in his opinion in Donau Chemie, Advocate General Jääskinen 
examined the scope of Article 19(1) TFEU advancing the view that 
 
“in the light of that Treaty provision, the standard of effective judicial 
protection for EU based rights seems to be more demanding than the 
classical formula [of the ‘effectiveness’ principle] referring to practical 
impossibility or excessive difficulty. In my opinion, this means that 
national remedies must be accessible, prompt, and reasonably cost 
effective”10. 
 
The CJEU did not follow the AG’s approach on this issue and retained its 
previous definition of the principle of effectiveness. In VEBIC and in Kone, 
the CJEU employed the principle of effectiveness (or full effectiveness) in 
order to derive from the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU an obligation for 
Member States to entitle national competition authorities to participate, as 
a defendant or respondent, in proceedings before a national court which 
                                                          
9
 Joint cases C-295-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al. 
[2006] ECR I-6619. 
10
 Case C-536/11 Donau Chemie [June 6
th
 2013, not yet published], para. 47. 
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challenge a decision that the authority itself has taken (in VEBIC) or the 
right for victims of umbrella pricing to claim compensation for harm 
suffered by an anticompetitive conduct in case there is a direct causal link 
between that conduct and the harm they suffered (in Kone). What is 
interesting in both cases is the insistence that the aims followed by Article 
101 TFEU should not be put “at risk”11. According to the Court, 
 
“[…] it is clear from the case-law of the Court […] that national 
legislation must ensure that European Union competition law is fully 
effective […] Those rules must therefore specifically take into account 
the objective pursued by Article 101 TFEU, which aims to guarantee 
effective and undistorted competition in the internal market, and 
accordingly, prices set on the basis of free competition”12. 
 
The consideration of the objective pursued by Articles 101 (and 102) 
TFEU seems therefore a passage obligé for the hermeneutical 
endeavours of the CJEU with regard to the principle of effectiveness. 
National remedial provisions should be interpreted accordingly so as to 
avoid any possible risk as to the full realization of the objectives of the 
abovementioned provisions of the Treaty. One may note the almost 
unlimited hermeneutical potential of this construction, as to the intervention 
of the CJEU in curtailing national procedural autonomy. 
 
 The third level of development of the effectiveness principle follows 
naturally from the previous one and, according to Reich, consists in the 
development of “hybrid” EU remedies, whose function is to “upgrade” 
national remedies. Reich explains that Article 19(1) sentence 2 TEU 
establishes a clear link between “effective protection” and “sufficient 
remedies”, thus positing a unidirectional relation between EU granted 
rights and national remedies: the recognition of EU rights should lead to 
the development of “sufficient” national remedies to fully ensure their 
respective scope of protection. The absence of “sufficient” national 
remedial tools cannot nevertheless question the scope of the EU granted 
right. National law should be interpreted creatively so as to ensure the 
minimum core of effective enforcement for the EU granted right. This 
requires, according to Reich, a three-steps approach: (i) “the first step is 
concerned with  finding appropriate national remedies in case of violations 
of EU granted rights”; (ii) the “national remedy has to be measured against 
the yardstick of the negative, eliminatory EU principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence and if the result is unsatisfactory from an EU law point of 
view as interpreted as providing ‘insufficient remedies’, it has to be 
‘upgraded’ to meet EU standards”; (iii) “the remedy thus found is a ‘hybrid’ 
                                                          
1111
 Case C-439/08, Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen von Brood – en Banketbakkers, 
Ijsbereiders en chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW [2010] ECR I-12471, para. 58 (“[…] the 
very existence of such a risk is likely to compromise the exercise of the specific obligation on 
national competition authorities under the Regulation to ensure the effective application of 
Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU”; Case C-557/12, Kone AG, Otis GmbH, Schindler Aufzüge 
und Fahrteppen GmbH  et al v. OBB- Infrastruktur AG [June 5
th
, 2014, not yet published], 
para 33. 
12
 Case C-557/12, Kone AG, Otis GmbH, Schindler Aufzüge und Fahrteppen GmbH  et al v. 
OBB- Infrastruktur AG [June 5
th
, 2014, not yet published], para. 32. 
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insofar as it takes up elements of national law in the limits of the principle 
of procedural autonomy, as well as effectiveness in its different 
functions”13.  
 
Precisely because of this “hybrid” character, the definition of what constitutes 
an “effective” remedy is a highly contextual issue, which depends on the 
perceived adequacy of the national remedial tools at the disposal of EU law 
and of the scope of the rights and corresponding duties generated by the 
provision of EU law interpreted. For instance, the scope of the secondary right 
(remedy) to claim damages for infringements of EU competition law, 
recognized by the EU courts, even if national law is silent on this issue, may 
have a different scope, depending on the interpretation one may have of the 
primary right preserved by this remedy14.  
 
Although the EU courts do not explicitly posit the link between this secondary 
right (remedy) and a primary right, this is essentially required, the first step in 
their reasoning consisting in interpreting the substantive provisions of the 
Treaty in competition law (in particular Article 101 TFEU) so as to derive a 
primary right “of any individual to seek compensation for loss caused by a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict competition”. By doing so, the EU law 
goes as far as defining the scope of the secondary right, which should 
presumably reflect the scope of the primary right it aims to preserve: the 
ability of the injured person to seek compensation for actual loss, loss of profit 
plus interest. One may advance that the scope of the secondary right would 
have been different, presumably wider, if it reflected a different primary right, 
for instance that of deterring future antitrust violations by the specific 
defendant (specific deterrence) or that of deterring future antitrust violations 
by any competition law infringer (general deterrence)15. In Manfredi, the Court 
did not exclude such interpretation of Article 101 TFEU of the Treaty, 
recognizing national legal systems the possibility to award punitive 
damages16. Yet, it did not interpret Article 101 TFEU as requiring the inclusion 
of punitive damages in the minimum core of the “hybrid” EU remedy of 
claiming damages for competition law infringements, as this did not relate to 
                                                          
13
 N. Reich, The Principle of Effectiveness and EU Private Law, in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot, F. 
Schulyok (eds.) General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2013), 301-326, 309. 
14
 On the distinction between primary and secondary (remedial) rights in the context of 
competition law enforcement, see I. Lianos, Competition law remedies: in search of a theory, 
in I. Lianos, & D. Sokol (eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law (Stanford University 
Press, 2012) 177-204; I. Lianos, Competition law remedies in Europe: Which Limits for 
Remedial Discretion?, in I. Lianos, & D. Geradin (eds.), Handbook of EU Competition Law: 
Enforcement and Procedure (Edward Elgar, 2013), 362-455. 
15
 The CJEU recognizes the deterrent effect of the right to claim damages, but this is not 
perceived independently from the primary right to claim compensation. See, for instance, 
Case C-557/12, Kone AG, Otis GmbH, Schindler Aufzüge und Fahrteppen GmbH  et al v. 
OBB- Infrastruktur AG [June 5
th
, 2014, not yet published], para. 23 (“(t)he right of any 
individual to claim compensation for such a loss actually strengthens the working of the 
European Union competition rules, since it discourages agreements or practices, frequently 
covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition, thereby making a significant 
contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union”. 
16
 Joint cases C-295-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al. 
[2006] ECR I-6619, paras 92-93. 
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the scope of the primary right recognized by the Court (that of receiving 
compensation)17.  
 
In other words, the main function of the principle of effectiveness is to 
maximise the “sufficient” attainment of the ends pursued by the primary right 
by providing the “adequate” content to the secondary right of claiming antitrust 
damages, and not to sculpt the essence of the primary right. 
 
The largely hermeneutic function of the principle of effectiveness has not 
escaped the attention of legal commentators, some, for instance, arguing that 
the principle has been used without much consistency, as a “kind of jack-in-
the-box instrument” allowing the EU Court to justify almost every result18. The 
“principle” of effectiveness was derided as being essentially “an empirical 
concept”, requiring the EU courts to proceed to a comparative examination of 
the national remedies available and also as providing the authorities the 
discretion to establish a low or a high level of enforcement, the principle being 
an instrument to achieve undefined policy objectives19. Although there is 
some grain of truth on this characterization of the “principle of effectiveness”, 
and the criticisms over an inconsistent application of that principle may be 
spot on, it remains, however, that the principle does not have a substantive 
content of its own, but reflects the substantive (primary) right to which it is 
associated. The principle of effectiveness cannot be seen functioning outside 
the context of the adjudication of the primary right violated by the competition 
law infringer.  
 
Claims for damages are usually perceived as an archetypical private law 
dispute, by which I mean a dispute between two parties, whose rights and 
duties are correlative to each other. For instance, the infringer’s wrong 
consists in the violation of the primary right of the victim. The secondary right 
of the victim for compensation correlates to the wrong committed by the 
infringer. Yet, not all competition law disputes may enter in this mould. Some 
remedies may have a considerable impact on other economic actors than the 
parties to the dispute, in a direct or an indirect way. Damages claims may also 
emanate from complex causation chains. One may think of claims introduced 
by indirect purchasers, counterfactual customers or umbrella customers. It 
may not always be easy to interpret the substantive provisions of EU 
competition law as giving rise to specific primary rights, like that of 
compensation for losses incurred because of the competition law violation, 
giving rise to secondary rights, such as that to claim damages. It may be, for 
instance, quite complex to transpose in rights’ (primary or secondary), and 
corresponding duties’, talk the infringement of Article 102 TFEU by a loyalty 
rebate of a dominant undertaking giving rise to a remedy of mandatory 
                                                          
17
 The CJEU relied in this case on the principle of equivalence, for punitive damages, rather 
than that of effectiveness: Joint cases C-295-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA et al. [2006] ECR I-6619, para. 99. 
18
 H.W. Micklitz, The CJEU between the Individual Citizen and the Member States – A Plea 
for a Judge Made European Law on Remedies, in H. Micklitz & B. de Witte (eds.), The CJEU 
and the Autonomy of Member States (Intersentia, 2012), 349-400, 397. 
19
 See, H.W. Micklitz, The CJEU between the Individual Citizen and the Member States – A 
Plea for a Judge Made European Law on Remedies, in H. Micklitz & B. de Witte (eds.), The 
CJEU and the Autonomy of Member States (Intersentia, 2012), 349-400, 397. 
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injunction. How would the effectiveness of the remedy be judged in this 
context? Should the primary right be in this case that of the equal opportunity 
of the dominant firm’s competitors to access the market? But, what size of the 
market would it be considered “sufficient” so as to preserve the essence of 
that “primary” right? Would the primary right be that of the consumers’ of the 
dominant undertaking who may be charged higher prices in the future, should 
the competitors be excluded from the market? In this case the primary right 
will need to reflect the economic theory of consumer harm advanced, a quite 
difficult task. Or is the primary right that of the “public at large” been deprived 
from a moral right to the protection of “competition as such”20? This will 
inevitably raise the issue of the delimitation of this primary moral right. The 
conceptual plasticity of the substantive provisions of EU competition law may 
lead, if combined with an instrumental view of the principle of effectiveness, to 
a quite broad remedial discretion for decision-makers.  
 
Similarly, the secondary right (remedy) may be interpreted broadly so as to 
enable the adoption of competition law remedies that have a prophylactic 
(preventive) aim21. These remedies seek to ensure that there remain no 
practices likely to result in distortions of competition and infringements in the 
future. Prophylactic remedies may be distinguished from specific deterrence 
as they affect the ability (and not the incentive) of the infringers to commit 
equivalent anti-competitive practices in the future by focusing on specific 
facilitators of potential infringements. These are not illegal practices in 
themselves, but in the specific circumstances of the case, they may facilitate 
illegal conduct. By prohibiting these practices, the decision-maker’s objective 
is not to deter the potential infringers from adopting such conduct, as this is 
not illegal, but to reduce their ability to commit illegal practices. 
 
In addition, in an economically oriented competition law, the definition of what 
is “optimal”, “sufficient” or “appropriate” remedy may also be influenced by the 
view economists take on optimal deterrence (the optimal deterrence model) 
and on how the market equilibrium existing prior to the competition wrong may 
be improved by subsequent remedial action. The remedy may thus offer the 
opportunity to design a new market equilibrium, more competitive than the 
one following the infringement, but also, in some circumstances, more 
competitive than the one existing prior to the infringement in order to 
maximize welfare. Linking the principle of effectiveness with the concept of 
efficiency, perceived as wealth maximization, may nevertheless open 
Pandora’s Box with regard to the remedial discretion enjoyed by competition 
authorities and the courts. These may adopt far-reaching remedies which 
would not correlate with the wrong committed and thus the scope of the 
primary right that was violated. 
                                                          
20
 See, for instance, Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others [2009] ECR I-4529, 
para 38 where the Court of Justice of the EU accepted that “Article 81 EC [now Article 101 
TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of 
the market and thus competition as such”. 
21
 On prophylactic remedies in competition law, see I. Lianos, Competition law remedies in 
Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?, in I. Lianos & D. Geradin (eds.), Handbook of 
EU Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure (Edward Elgar, 2013), 362-455. 
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Yet, “discretionary remedialism” cannot be the rule of the game22. This is clear 
in view of the importance the principle of proportionality has in delimiting the 
remedial discretion of competition authorities and courts in EU competition 
law, if one takes a public law perspective on remedies. The principle of 
proportionality requires that measures adopted by Community institutions do 
not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain 
the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question; when there is 
a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the 
least onerous one, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued. This trade-of exercise involves in 
addition to considering if the means chosen are indeed a rational means to a 
purported end (step 1 of the test), some assessment of the possible excessive 
costs of the remedial action in relation to its benefits (step 2) and whether the 
means chosen are the least restrictive to the affected interests’ alternative 
(step 3). The first step of the proportionality principle is of particular interest for 
our purposes. The importance of remedial fit is often stressed by antitrust law 
literature23. It is also indirectly linked with the existence of a causal relation 
between the undertaking’s conduct and the theory of harm advanced. The 
scope of the obligations imposed on the undertakings concerned in order to 
bring the infringements to an end identified should be implemented according 
to the nature of the infringement declared and the obligations imposed ‘must 
not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought, 
namely re-establishment of compliance with the rules infringed’.24 This relates 
to the obligation of the Commission to give the undertakings concerned the 
opportunity of being heard on the matters to which it has taken objection. For 
example, the Commission is not entitled to impose a fine on an undertaking 
without having previously informed it in the statement of objections that it 
intended to do so, a requirement which applies by analogy also to remedies.25 
The existence of a competition law violation (even if there is no explicit finding 
of an infringement) “constitutes the basis of the obligation of the parties to 
terminate the infringement”, hence the reason for imposing remedies.26 
 
However, if the principle of proportionality requires a close fit between the 
harm and the remedy, determining the nature of that fit (functional, 
instrumental) remains an open question. The flexibility of the concept of the 
theory of harm, in particular its linkage to economic theory, enables the 
                                                          
22
 On discretionary remedialism, see the analysis in I. Lianos, Competition law remedies: in 
search of a theory, in I. Lianos, & D. Sokol (eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law 
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Commission or the competition authorities to enjoy a wide remedial discretion, 
in particular when adopting prophylactic remedies. 
 
While in phase with the principle of effectiveness, prophylactic remedies have 
nevertheless be considered in certain circumstances as extending 
unreasonably the scope of the remedy, with regard to the scope of the 
primary right violated and thus the wrong committed. For instance, in a 
number of cases, the Commission required the undertakings concerned under 
its infringement decision to refrain in the future from any conduct which may 
have a same or similar effect to those covered by the infringement decision, 
with the aim of preventing the undertakings from repeating the behaviour 
found to be unlawful.27  
 
In Cartonboard, the Commission prohibited any future exchange of 
commercial information by which the participants directly or indirectly obtained 
commercial information on competitors, even if this was not by its nature 
unlawful under Article 101 TFEU as the information related also to certain 
aggregated statistical data.28 The General Court found that such prohibition 
exceeded what was necessary in order to bring the conduct in question into 
line with what was lawful because it was seeking to prevent the exchange of 
purely statistical information which was not in, or capable of being put into, the 
form of individual information and thus used for anti-competitive purposes. 
Indeed, the Commission had not considered the exchange of statistical data 
to be in itself an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. According to the Court, 
‘the mere fact that a system for the exchange of statistical information might 
be used for anti-competitive purposes does not make it contrary to Article 
[101(1) TFEU], since in such circumstances it is necessary to establish its 
actual anti-competitive effect’.29  
 
In Atlantic Container the CJEU annulled part of the Commission’s decision for 
having imposed on the parties to the infringement an obligation to renegotiate 
or terminate the service contracts concluded between the shippers and the 
maritime conference, which were not found to be illegal under Article 101 
TFEU (as only the provisions of the TAA relating to price-fixing and capacity 
were found by the Commission to infringe this provision).30 The Commission 
had adopted this requirement of re-negotiation or termination as a 
prophylactic remedy in order to prevent the members of a cartel to continue to 
apply unlawfully fixed prices simply because these prices were incorporated in 
long-term contracts. In other words, the requirement to renegotiate or 
terminate the service contracts was justified by the fact that the effects of the 
                                                          
27
 Case T-310/94, Gruber & Weber GmbH & Co KG [1998] ECR II-1043, para. 167; Case T-
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29
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infringements identified in the decision would have continued to exist if the 
addressees of that decision were able to continue to enjoy the economic 
advantages secured by ongoing contracts entered into on the basis of the 
horizontal agreement to fix prices and limit supply found illegal by the 
Commission.31 As this section of the decision formed part of the order bringing 
the infringement to an end, the Commission alleged that there was no need to 
give specific reasons or to draw it to the attention of the parties concerned in 
the statement of objections. The Court did not agree with this view, noting that 
the likelihood of private actions for damages should be a sufficient 
disincentive for the defendants to continue behaviour that would have 
maintained or facilitated the effects of the core infringement to Article 101 
TFEU, and in any case, the Commission had the obligation to ‘explain its 
reasoning’ as to how the prophylactic measures suggested were ‘obviously 
necessary’ to put the main infringement to an end, something that the 
Commission’s decision had not done.32 The Court even observed that ‘the 
statement of objections should in any event have set out, even briefly, but in 
sufficiently clear terms, the measures which the Commission intended to take 
in order to bring an end to the infringements and should have given the 
applicants all the information necessary in order to enable them properly to 
defend themselves before the Commission adopted a final decision on that 
point’, in view of the rights of defence of the defendants and the requirement 
that they should be offered a proper opportunity to make known their view.33  
 
The instrumental use of the principle of effectiveness in order to expand the 
remedial discretion of the competition authorities is closely interrelated to the 
question of the legitimacy of competition authorities and the judiciary in 
competition law cases to adopt far–reaching remedies that may restrict 
individual rights34. Both public and private lawyers recognize the existence of 
inherent limits to the remedial action of competition authorities and the 
judiciary, even if they may take different perspectives in this context.  
 
The private law account of remedial action emphasizes correlativity as an 
essential feature of private law disputes35. Correlativity perceives the parties’ 
relationship as a “bipolar unit in which each party’s normative position is 
intelligible only in the light of the other’s”36. The duty of one party is the mirror 
image of the other party’s right. The structure of the remedy should thus 
“reflect the structure of the injustice, retracing and reversing the movement 
between the parties”. In private law disputes losses by the claimants are 
correlative to gains by the infringer. Courts may effectively exercise their 
adjudicatory function to determine, based on the evidence heard on the 
structure of the pre-existing relation between the claimant and the defendant, 
the appropriate relational structure post-infringement, with the understanding 
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that this should be equivalent to that prior to the infringement. The court’s or 
other decision-maker’s discretion is thus bound in the context of private law 
resolution of disputes by the fact that remedies should not go beyond the 
structure of the pre-existing relation between the correlative entitlements and 
obligations of the parties to the dispute.  
 
An important difference between the private and the public law accounts of 
the remedial process is that while the former is based on the idea of 
correlativity, the latter is by essence polycentric, because of the variety of 
interests to be considered by the public authority charged with the protection 
of the general interest, by essence a polycentric concept. In a public law 
context, because the judge or authority is seeking to implement generally 
articulated, aspirational norms in highly differentiated contexts, liability norms 
do not dictate the content of the remedy. Liability norms only provide the goals 
and boundaries for the remedial decision. In this context, the linkage between 
remedies and rights (or wrongs) is instrumental, as the liability stage indirectly 
constraints the targets of the remedial process, whose aim is to provide a 
solution to a specifically determined (at the liability stage) problem37. The 
normative parameters that have been set at the liability stage in the form of 
problems that the remedy must address operate at the same time as a guide 
and as a constraint to the exercise of remedial discretion in a public law 
context. Some trade-off devices are thus developed in order to mediate 
between the different interests represented in these polycentric disputes, the 
principle of proportionality being one of them. 
 
It follows from the above that despite the instrumental use of the principle of 
effectiveness in order to elaborate a minimum core of “hybrid” EU/national 
remedies, with the aim to ensure the effective enforcement of competition law, 
legitimacy concerns may limit the remedial action of competition authorities 
and courts. The following section attempts to address the question of 
legitimacy in the context of remedial action, by exploring the hypothesis that 
this is related to the limits of adjudication, as a distinct form of social ordering 
than, for instance, regulation or contract. 
 
III. Legitimate remedies and the limits of adjudication 
 
In exploring the limits of adjudication, with the aim to set clear limits to the 
legitimacy of judicial action, Fuller referred to the principle of polycentricity, 
which he defined as “situation(s) of interacting points of influence” which 
“involve many affected parties and a somewhat fluid state of affairs”38. 
Intervention in this context may have “complex repercussions”39. Fuller 
observes that one may  
 
                                                          
37
 See, I. Lianos, Competition law remedies in Europe: Which Limits for Remedial Discretion?, 
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“visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider’s web. A pull on 
one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern 
throughout the web as a whole […] This is a ‘polycentric’ situation 
because it is ‘many centered’ – each crossing of strands is a distinct 
center for distributing tensions”40. 
 
According to Fuller, the adjudication of polycentric disputes is problematic 
because the complexity of the dispute and the range of those affected, which 
sometimes it is difficult to foresee, render it quite difficult to organize their 
participation to the dispute so as to represent their position. Informed only by 
the litigating parties, the decision-maker is ill-equipped to determine the 
impact of the decision reached on the different interests affected, with the 
consequence that the decision reached may negatively affect societal welfare.  
Because of the adjudicator’s limited competence, Fuller considers that in view 
of the need to appreciate complex repercussions to interests not directly 
represented in the dispute, significantly polycentric disputes. 
 
What becomes important is thus the “question of knowing when the 
polycentric elements have become so significant and predominant that the 
proper limits of adjudication have been reached”41. Problems that are 
sufficiently polycentric may be unsuited for adjudication and may be resolved 
through managerial direction, through negotiation and contract42, or left to the 
forces of the market. Some problems, such as the allocation of economic 
resources, may indeed “present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable 
for adjudication”43. Fuller explains what happens when an attempt is made to 
deal by adjudicative forms with a problem that is essentially polycentric: 
 
“[…] three things can happen, sometimes all at once. First, the 
adjudicative solution may fail. Unexpected repercussions make the 
decision unworkable; it is ignored, withdrawn, or modified, sometimes 
repeatedly. Second, the purported arbiter ignores judicial proprieties - 
he "tries out" various solutions in post-hearing conferences, consults 
parties not represented at the hearings, guesses at facts not proved 
and not properly matters for anything like judicial notice. Third, instead 
of accommodating his procedures to the nature of the problem he 
confronts, he may reformulate the problem so as to make it amenable 
to solution through adjudicative procedures”44. 
 
This does not necessarily mean that contracts and managerial administrative 
discretion do not have problems of their own when dealing with polycentric 
disputes45. Contracts are generally ill-suited to inequalities of bargaining 
power, and managerial and administrative discretion may raise important 
problems of unlimited discretion. Yet, these methods may integrate more fully 
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the under-represented interests to the adjudicatory procedure and take into 
account evidence ad arguments emanating from others than the initial parties 
to the dispute. 
 
Fuller’s reference to polycentric disputes is highly relevant for our discussion 
of competition law remedies, the remedial process constituting an instance of 
adjudication. The enforcement of competition law requires the balancing of 
different interests, even though recourse to balancing (or the rule of reason as 
it is called in US antitrust law) is in some circumstances limited by categorical 
thinking and the establishment of presumptions (per se categories in US 
antitrust law or object restrictions in EU competition law). In fine, the formation 
of specific categories, such as specific types of abuse, subject to particular 
standards or tests (i.e. margin squeeze, refusal to deal), depends, however, 
on some pre-balancing of the interests usually affected, together with 
considerations of procedural economy and error cost analysis. Hence, 
categorization may be considered as a form of dynamic balancing of 
principles and policies with the aim to promote the effectiveness of 
competition law enforcement: in this case reduce the administrative costs of 
enforcement while avoiding the risk of substantive errors. An illustration of this 
dynamic approach in establishing legal categories constitutes the evolution of 
the object box in EU competition law, which has recently been expanded to 
cover certain forms of information exchange46, the prohibition of Internet sales 
in the context of a vertical agreement47, or even vertical practices particularly 
suspicious in view of the structure of the specific market48, the latter being 
considered by some as an excursion outside what has been considered so far 
as the traditional domain of the object box, which does not require the 
consideration of information relating to the structure of the relevant market 
affected. 
 
 The move towards a more effects-based approach has accentuated the 
polycentric dimension of competition law disputes. Final and intermediate 
consumers active in the specific relevant market were added to the list of the 
participants affected by the adjudicated transaction, their interest(s) being 
given the most important weight in the decision-making process (because of 
the emphasis on consumer harm). The number of affected participants and 
the complexity of repercussions, because of the variety of interests to take 
into account, is particularly noteworthy in competition law disputes involving 
market leaders controlling industry standards, thus affecting an array of 
interrelated economic sectors, not necessarily directly linked to the relevant 
market of the specific competition law dispute. For instance, cases like 
Google or Microsoft have profound implications on innovation and the 
development of competition in the broader IT sector globally. A similar 
conclusion may be reached with regard to competition law disputes involving 
key inputs to economic production, i.e. in energy and telecommunications, 
which may have an important impact on the economy overall. The remedies 
adopted in the context of such disputes have often been characterized as an 
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instance of “regulatory antitrust”, the perception being that competition law 
has moved away from its archetype of adjudication towards a different form of 
social ordering, such as regulation49. There seems to be a fine line between 
competition law remedies and regulatory remedies, which in some cases, EU 
competition law has seemingly transgressed, thus leading to the accusation of 
“regulatory antitrust”, the latter perception being perceived as an oxymoron. 
For instance, Ibañez Colomo, argues that this transgression may take 
different forms: First, competition may become regulatory in nature ‘when its 
application on a proscriptive basis (rather than prescriptive basis) would not 
be possible given the features of the relevant market’.50 Second, the 
‘expected standards of intervention in a competition law case can be defined 
as the composite of (i) the gravity of the infringement identified and (ii) the 
remedies (if any) required to bring an end to it’, the relationship between the 
two being presumed to be a ‘linear one, that is, the intrusiveness of a given 
remedy increases in direct proportion with the gravity of the infringement’.51  
 
However, when competition law is “instrumentalised”, and this expression is 
left without definition by the author, “the remedies imposed in a given case 
may exceed what would be necessary to bring an end to the infringement 
identified by the authority”52. The correlative relation between remedies and 
rights/wrongs is thus perceived as the defining boundary between competition 
law remedies and regulatory remedies. The two “do not follow the same 
logic”, as the former are generally concerned “with preserving the existing 
market structure from being further deteriorated”, thus leading to remedies 
that reflect the wrong committed, and not with re-designing the current market 
structure, by “sharing (or neutralising competitive advantages)”, which may 
give rise to remedies that go beyond the wrong committed.53 
 
In an economically-oriented competition law, this boundary is more easily 
described than practised. Theories of consumer harm may not only relate to 
the structure of the supply side but may also be generated by the specific 
characteristics of the demand side. Behavioural economics may provide 
insights on how some behavioural biases of consumers may be exploited by 
incumbents in order to raise prices. If the practices of the incumbents are 
caught by competition law, the remedy will need to address these behavioural 
biases in order to be effective. Yet, providing for remedies dealing with 
existing behavioural biases will not just restore the competitive process, but 
will generate a very different one than the one prior to the identified 
‘competition law’ infringement. Would that remedy be considered as having a 
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regulatory nature and hence being outside the normal scope of competition 
law remedies as it aims to shape the conditions of competition in the market? 
 
Yet, the polycentric character of complex competition law disputes is much 
more limited than that of pure regulatory law disputes. First, competition law 
remedies54 relate to the exercise of an adjudicative function, either of a 
competition authority or of a court, defined as the adversarial presentation of 
proofs and reasoned arguments to a decision-maker55, and should thus be 
distinguished from remedies adopted in the context of a rule-making activity, 
as is often the case in regulation. Second, even when regulators exercise an 
adjudicative function in enforcing regulation, the polycentric nature of the 
regulatory dispute is more pronounced than in the context of competition law, 
the decision taking explicitly into account the economic conditions of an entire 
sector of activities, rather than the competitive conditions of a specific relevant 
market on which the parties to the dispute are active, by definition a narrower 
exercise. Third, the interests that are usually considered in a regulatory 
dispute are in principle more diverse than those taken into account in 
competition law disputes, the regulators assuming various responsibilities, 
such as the protection of the environment, universal service, security of 
supply, and so on, while competition authorities’ role is primarily confined to 
the protection of the competitive process. As a result of the variety of 
regulatory goals, there is more extensive participation in the decision-making 
process of actors representing diverse interests, often not directly related to 
the dispute. 
 
Focusing, for illustration purposes, on merger control, which is the closest a 
competition law procedure can come to a regulatory law one, the EU Merger 
Implementing Regulation provides for the participation in the process of ‘third 
parties’, a category which is narrowly defined as including those having a 
‘sufficient interest’ in the Commission’s procedure, such as customers, 
suppliers, competitors, members of the administration or management organs 
of the undertakings concerned or recognised workers’ representatives of 
those undertakings.56 Certainly, the Commission has appointed a Consumer 
Liaison officer and might also invite the views of other interested third parties 
including consumer organisations,57 but these parties do not have a right to be 
heard in the absence of an explicit invitation by the Commission. In any case, 
the third parties are expected to comment only on the competition implications 
of the merger, rather than on broader issues, such as the protection of 
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employment, environment, and so on.58 This contrasts with the wide 
participation of various interests in the context of regulatory decision-making, 
often with the involvement of intermediary, although not elected, bodies 
representing a supposed public interest, and less frequently, by direct 
intervention from interested publics. Consequently, despite the polycentric 
dimension of most competition law decisions,59 remedies are precisely 
confined to address the specific situation under adjudication. Indeed, the 
boundaries of remedial discretion are delimited by the interplay of the specific 
goals entrusted to competition authorities, the principle of remedial 
proportionality and the control of legality for misuse of powers.60 
 
One may however criticize Fuller’s narrow view of adjudication as essentially 
involving adversarial presentation of evidence and arguments between the 
parties to the litigation. First “concealed polycentric elements” exist in all 
problems solved by adjudication61. Second, dispute resolution does not 
constitute the only model of adjudication. Commenting on the development of 
constitutional adjudication, Hiss argued that a new model of adjudication, 
which he called “structural reform” has emerged challenging the narrow 
conception of the function of adjudication62. While the dispute resolution 
model is a “sociologically impoverished universe”, “one that does not account 
for social groups and bureaucratic institutions”, its world being composed 
exclusively of individuals, the litigants, the “structural” model is characterized 
by a multiplicity of parties and an array of competing interests and 
perspectives63. Although dispute resolution “implies a unity of functions in 
party structure”, i.e. “the plaintiff is simultaneously the victim, the beneficiary 
of the remedy, and also the spokesperson”, the structural model is 
characterized by a fragmentation of the roles, precisely because of the 
introduction of sociological entities, such as in the context of competition law 
disputes, the competitors or consumers. For instance, the possibility for the 
Commission, acting on its own initiative, pursuant to Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003, to submit written observations ("amicus curiae" 
observations) to courts of the Member States where the coherent application 
of Article 101 or 102 TFEU so requires, provides the opportunity to the 
national courts to hear evidence and arguments that may not have been 
proffered by the litigants and which relate to the broader EU interest to ensure 
a coherent enforcement of EU competition law throughout the Union. The 
function of remedies is also different in the context of the “structural” model. 
Its main role consists in eliminating threats to the values (effective 
competition) protected by the law (a prophylactic aim), eventually restructuring 
the organization that committed the infringement, “a complex and difficult task 
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wholly alien to the dispute resolution model”64. Consequently, while the 
remedial process in the dispute resolution model is based on the assumption 
that the aim of adjudication is to assess the “abnormal” event that has caused 
the dispute and to restore the parties to their rightful position, that is, the 
position that they would have occupied absent that specific abnormal event (in 
other words the violation of EU competition law), the “structural” model 
“reflects doubt on whether the status quo is efficient”, eventually promoting 
the establishment of a new status quo65. 
 
One should therefore come into grips with the fact that competition law 
enforcement constitutes an instance of “structural” adjudication, rather than 
belonging to the “dispute resolution” model. This renders the distinction with 
the administrative/managerial model particularly difficult at times, at a practical 
level, although there is some value in thinking of the two (adjudication and 
administrative managerial model) as ideal types forming a continuum with 
regard to the “appropriate” degree of discretion and consequently the 
legitimacy of the action of the institutions in charge, which is closely related to 
the participation of the interests affected. Put simply, the more EU competition 
law moves towards the regulatory/managerial model, and “structural” 
adjudication comes close to that, the more it should integrate the legitimacy-
building mechanisms of such model, with an enhanced participation of the 
entities subject to the remedies as well as of all those whose interests may be 
affected (i.e. consumers, competitors in related markets, interests vicariously 
represented by organizations and citizen’s groups, i.e. environmental 
associations). The triadic model of dispute resolution, limited to the parties 
and the adjudicator, needs to give way in circumstances of significantly 
polycentric disputes to the more inclusive model of “structural” adjudication in 
order to preserve the legitimacy of competition law enforcement and its 
continued relevance and appeal to society at large. 
 
 
IV. Remedial discretion and commitment decisions: exploring the 
limits of adjudication 
 
The delimitation of the fine boundary between adjudication and the 
managerial or administrative model is not the only challenge to which mature 
competition law enforcement systems are confronted in devising effective 
remedies. In recent years, we have witnessed a significant displacement of 
the adjudicative EU competition law enforcement model by a presumably 
“consensual” model of competition law enforcement, with the increasing use 
of commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/200366. From 2004 to 
2014 there have been 35 commitment decisions as opposed to only 21 
infringement non-cartel decisions, adopted under Article 7 of Regulation 
1/2003. National competition authorities have also turned with an increasing 
amount of zeal to a sustained use of commitment decisions in order to resolve 
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competition law disputes67. Theoretically justified by the need to ensure an 
effective use of the scarce resources of competition authorities and 
procedural economy benefits68, the use of the procedure of commitment 
decisions constitutes in reality another illustration of the limits of the classic 
model of adjudication in competition law enforcement, and the need to adopt 
procedures that maximize the aims of competition law enforcers, while 
keeping an eye on the legitimacy of their action. 
 
One may validly ask if commitment decisions fit the adjudicative model or may 
be considered as closer to the model of negotiation and contract, or that of the 
regulatory model, which form distinct categories of social ordering if we follow 
Fuller’s perspective.  
 
One could explore the similarities and differences between commitments 
decisions in antitrust and in merger control, in order to characterize such 
decisions as fitting in one of the models of decision-making advanced by 
Fuller. In merger control, remedies take the form of commitments offered by 
the parties to the merger, either at Phase I or Phase II of the merger 
procedure, which are eventually accepted by the Commission if they address 
its ‘serious doubts’ over the legality of the merger or the ‘competition 
concerns’ identified. This leads to the publication of a decision under Article 
6(2) or 8(2) of the EC Merger Control Regulation, which makes binding the 
commitments offered by the parties. In the context of the ex post competition 
law enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
enables the Commission to make commitments offered by parties to its 
proceedings binding on them, instead of issuing a regular prohibition decision, 
when those commitments address the concerns expressed in the 
Commission’s preliminary assessment. Such a decision may be adopted for a 
specified period and ‘shall’ conclude that there are no longer ‘grounds for 
action’ by the Commission. Technically, commitment decisions offered under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 are not remedies as they do not aim to put the 
infringement to an end, as it is the case for Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 and 
phase II merger control decisions and do not make any finding as to whether 
there has been an infringement.69 Their only legal effect is to close the 
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Commission’s proceedings. Essentially, it is considered as a measure of 
“procedural economy”.70 
 
In addition, as it was noted by AG Kokott in Alrosa, “unlike Article 7, Article 9 
of Regulation 1/2003 is not an instrument for establishing infringements of 
competition law, but merely gives the Commission the possibility of effectively 
addressing concerns over competition for the future”.71 Contrary to Article 7 
infringement decisions, they cannot be used as conclusive evidence of the 
existence of an infringement of EU competition rules in follow on private 
actions for damages.72 Yet, from a functional perspective they can be qualified 
as ‘remedies’, as they aim to redress the situation of the victims of the 
competition law violation to that prior to the infringement. 
 
As both Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 commitment decisions and decisions 
adopted in the context of merger control are formally suggested by the parties 
to the transaction, they have been distinguished from other competition law 
remedies and sanctions, which are imposed unilaterally by the Commission 
and are not the product of a “voluntary” agreement between the Commission 
and the parties to the dispute (coercive remedies).73 In a similar vein, 
commentators, and most recently the CJEU, consider that commitment 
decisions form part of what has been characterized as a “consensual 
competition law enforcement” or a culture of “settlement”, hence accentuating 
the opposition between the voluntary nature of commitment decisions and the 
coercive nature of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 decisions imposing 
injunctions on the parties.74 
 
The EU courts have relied on the classification of remedies as voluntary or 
coercive, when dealing with the question of the degree of the remedial 
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discretion competition authorities benefit from in EU antitrust and merger 
proceedings. Competition authorities are subject to restrictions in the use of 
voluntary remedies, at least in antitrust proceedings. Recital 13 of Regulation 
1/2003 warns that commitment decisions under Article 9 may not be 
appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. 
Hardcore cartel cases, generally subject to fines, cannot be closed by a 
commitment decision.75 The principle of proportionality may also limit the 
remedial discretion of competition authorities in both merger and antitrust 
proceedings, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of the remedial action of 
competition authorities.  
 
Yet, in Alrosa, the CJEU struck down the judgment of the General Court for 
having applied to a similar extent the proportionality control in Article 9 and 
Article 7 decisions.76 The CJEU noted that ‘the obligation on the Commission 
to ensure that the principle of proportionality is observed has a different extent 
and content, depending on whether it is considered in relation to the former or 
the latter article’.77 It further explained that: 
 
“application of the principle of proportionality by the Commission in the 
context of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 is confined to verifying that 
the commitments in question address the concerns it expressed to the 
undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less onerous 
commitments that also address those concerns adequately”.78 
 
Although both Article 7 and 9 decisions are subject to the principle of 
proportionality, the application of that principle differs according to which of 
those provisions is concerned. Hence, according to the CJEU: 
 
“(t)here is therefore no reason why the measure which could possibly 
be imposed in the context of Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003 should 
have to serve as a reference for the purpose of assessing the extent of 
the commitments accepted under Article 9 of the regulation, or why 
anything going beyond that measure should automatically be regarded 
as disproportionate […]. 
 
Undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of Article 9 of 
Regulation No 1/2003 consciously accept that the concessions they 
make may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on 
them in a decision adopted under Article 7 of the regulation after a 
thorough examination”.79 
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Following Alrosa, the distinction between voluntary and unilateral remedies 
leads to a different application of the proportionality principle, hence to a 
greater variation in the degree of judicial scrutiny of remedies and 
consequently the remedial discretion of the Commission. In addition to the 
differential implementation of the proportionality principle, in the context of 
judicial review, the perceived consensual nature of the commitment procedure 
may weaken the link between the wrong and the remedy adopted, 
presumably pushing the authority to use its bargaining power in order to 
achieve remedies that would not only attempt to reverse the situation to the 
status quo ante the infringement but would also aim to establish a new, 
allegedly more competitive, equilibrium, under the pretext that the parties 
subject to the remedy have consented to it. Indeed, the voluntary nature of 
commitments may enable them to go further in their scope than what could be 
the scope of an infringement decision, if the latter option was chosen80. 
 
The distinction between infringement decisions under Article 7, allegedly 
inspired by a “public law” paradigm and commitment decisions, relying on a 
“contract law paradigm” does not however take sufficiently into account the 
important similarities between injunctions and commitments in EU competition 
law. The reference to the ‘public law paradigm’ as a separate pole to the 
‘contract law’ one seems far-fetched, in view of the importance of 
‘administrative contracts’ in continental administrative law, but also of the 
distinction between imperium merum (the power to coerce) and jurisdictio (the 
power to make legal decisions).81 Remedies do not form part of the imperium 
but of the mixtum imperium, the power which a magistrate has for the 
purposes of administering the civil (not criminal) part of the law, which is 
incident to jurisdictio. If remedies were classified within the imperium it would 
not have been possible, first, for arbitration clauses to be included in merger 
remedies, arbitration being in this case a forced “contract”, which is a distinct 
possibility in EU merger control,82 and, second, for remedial injunctions to 
produce extraterritorial effects.83  
 
More troubling is the opposition sometimes made between the passive role of 
the parties in Article 7 proceedings and their active role in commitment 
decisions, in merger control or in the context of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. 
Despite the “coercive” appearance of an injunction, often this is the result of a 
prior (failed) negotiation between the Commission and the parties concerned, 
the Commission attempting at least to achieve some form of adhesion from 
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the parties that will guarantee the proper execution of the remedy.84 The 
psychological pressure that an infringement decision might be adopted by the 
Commission, in the absence of commitments offered by the parties, largely 
denies the voluntary and consensual nature of the process and enables the 
Commission to extract disproportionate remedies.  
 
To this one may add the possibilities offered to the Commission to make 
strategic use of commitment decisions in order to achieve regulatory 
objectives, such as the liberalization of the energy sector, the regulation of 
payment systems, or the opening up of systems competition in the high tech 
or the car industry sectors, to cite a few examples. As I have shown 
elsewhere the parties “consent” to these commitments, despite the obvious 
resources-related constraints of the Commission to follow all possible cases 
with an infringement decision, in view of the collective action problem they are 
facing, thus enabling the Commission and other competition authorities to 
leverage their investigative powers into substantial bargaining power, leading 
to commitments that do may go beyond what would have been achieved, had 
the Commission chosen instead an Article 7 infringement decision85.  
 
The competition authority may also adopt the strategy to invest first in some 
high profile Article 7 infringement decisions for certain kind of practices, which 
it can later capitalize with a number of commitment decisions anchored to this 
quite favourable legal precedent of an infringement decision, pushing the 
parties to commit to far-reaching remedies. A closer look to the commitment 
decisions adopted by the European Commission in recent years indicates that 
these relied on contested theories of harm, which may have been risky for the 
Commission to rely upon in an Article 7 infringement decision: excessive 
prices86, patent ambush87, collective dominance88, strategic 
underinvestment89, anticompetitive use of court injunctions90, to cite a few. 
 
As negotiations occur at the highest levels, between the Competition 
Commissionaire and the CEOs of these global, in most cases, corporations, 
commitment decisions may offer some room for politics and the consideration 
of broader public interests and values than the customary narrow focus on 
competition concerns, hence highlighting the polycentric nature of most of 
these disputes. For instance, although issues of privacy were not as such 
touched upon in the Commission’s competition investigation against Google, it 
is inevitable that the Commission’s investigation and the final decision on 
Google’s commitments, which should be taken by the college of 
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commissioners will be influenced by the overall context of Google’s disputes 
with European regulators91 and, likely, by the European policy to form a digital 
single market92. Broader competition policy concerns, such as market 
liberalization, were particularly influential in the choice of the instrument of 
commitment decisions in various cases the Commission investigated in the 
gaz and electricity markets93. Similar concerns over the need for regulation 
may have played in the financial services sector94. Finally, one should also 
factor in the considerable technical complexity of some markets investigated 
by the Commission, in particular in the high tech sector. It is virtually 
impossible to develop sound and effective remedies without an extensive and 
ongoing cooperation and sharing of information with the business entity which 
was found to infringe competition law and asked to restructure its organization 
and/or modify its conduct95. This may be best achieved in the context of a 
commitment procedure, rather than an Article 7 infringement decision, as the 
atmosphere of open conflict that the latter may generate may be an 
impediment to cooperation. 
 
The above, and not reasons of procedural economy, constitute the major 
drivers for the increasing use of commitment procedures in EU competition 
law.  
 
Remedies adopted in the context of commitment decisions often fit closely to 
the model of “structural” adjudication: being prospective by nature and aiming 
to the elimination of any potential threat to the value of competition, by 
proceeding to the re-structuring of the organization involved in the violation of 
competition law, and not just the issuance of a prohibition aimed at some 
specific act or conduct96. For instance, in the recent Visa commitment 
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decision, in addition to the various price caps on the setting of multilaterally 
agreed interchange fees to which Visa agreed, it also took the commitment to 
implement further transparency measures re-organizing its relations with the 
merchants’ banks (acquirers)97. The process is not also entirely at the hands 
of the competition authority and the infringer, as one would have expected to 
happen, in view of the “contractual” nature of the procedure, but involves the 
participation of interested third parties. These may contribute, according to 
Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, to the “market test” of the commitments, 
offering their view on the commitments offered by the defendant, before these 
are to be made binding by a decision of the Commission. In order to enhance 
the transparency of the process to the public, the Commission also publishes 
the full text of the commitments, as well as a press release setting out the key 
issues of the case. Interested parties may submit their observations within a 
fixed time limit which cannot be less than one month. It is also mentioned in 
the best practices of the Commission, that it may also “actively promote the 
market test” by sending, for instance, the market test document to third parties 
“which can potentially be concerned by the outcome of the case (e.g. 
consumer associations)” and by “informing in writing the complainant, inviting 
it to submit comments”98.  
 
Yet, despite these efforts to enhance participation in order to address the 
legitimacy concerns raised by the extensive use of the commitment 
procedure, the Commission enjoys a significant degree of unfettered 
discretion, in comparison to the one it disposes when adopting an 
infringement decision. First, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion to make 
the commitments binding or to reject them, without that choice being framed 
by self-restraining guidelines, as it is the case in some Member States99. 
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Second, there is no specific timeframe for accepting commitment decisions, 
which may also be agreed upon even after the statement of objections was 
sent to the parties100, while some national competition authorities limit 
explicitly the exercise of that discretion by imposing a specific timeframe101. 
Thirdly, third interested parties and the complainant are not offered adequate 
opportunities to participate to the procedure and represent their own 
arguments and evidence on the anticompetitive conduct in question. 
Certainly, according to Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, interested third 
parties may submit observations after the Commission has published a 
summary of the case, as well as the main content of the commitments or of 
the proposed course of action, in the Official Journal and the full text of the 
commitments is published on the DG Competition website, within a time limit 
fixed by the Commission, which may not be less than one month from the 
date of publication. However, the interested parties do not have access to the 
full evidence collected by the Commission, in particular its preliminary 
assessment, which may affect their ability to form a more accurate view over 
the anti-competitive conduct in question and its impact on their interests102. 
Fourthly, interested third parties have limited access to the courts in order to 
challenge commitment decisions. Third parties constitute “non-privileged 
applicants” and must satisfy the quite strict criteria of Article 263 TFEU, in 
particular demonstrate that they are individually concerned by the decision 
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they challenge103. It remains to be seen if these restrictive standing 
requirements will impede interested third parties from challenging in front of 
the CJEU commitment decisions that affect their own interests104. 
Furthermore, as I have previously noted, in Alrosa the CJEU has 
distinguished the proportionality ground of review for Article 9 Regulation 
1/2003 commitment decisions from that applying to Article 7 infringement 
decisions, thus transforming it to some form of reinforced control of the 
rationality (means-end test) of the remedy, even if the CJEU still keeps the 
proportionality label. The third step of the proportionality test, the assessment 
of the existence of a least restrictive alternative, which may usually exercise 
an important constraining effect to the discretion of the Commission, finds 
itself significantly emptied from its content. The judicial scrutiny cannot 
constitute an effective check and balance mechanism of the remedial action 
of the Commission in the context of commitment decisions. Finally, the 
Commission is not formally obliged to take into account the views presented 
by the third-parties, but simply to acknowledge them, without explaining the 
weight it provided, or not, to them in its final decision to accept the 
commitments “offered” by the parties105.  
 
The absence of extensive participatory rights for interested third parties 
(including the complainant) in the context of commitment decisions, despite 
the polycentric nature of the disputes frequently addressed by them, 
constitutes one of the major weaknesses of that procedure. In view of the 
increasing role commitments play in the conduct of competition law 
enforcement by the Commission, expanding the participation of interested 
parties (including the complainant) becomes an important site for procedural 
reform. As it has been recognized in the recently adopted European 
Competition Network (ECN) Recommendation on Commitment procedures, 
“the views of other players in the market on the proposed commitments can 
play an important part in assessing their adequacy to meet the competition 
concerns and to allow such third parties the opportunity to submit their 
observations”106. The Courts may also play an important role in reminding 
competition authorities of the need to reinforce the position of third parties 
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(and the complainant) in the commitment decisions procedure. For instance, 
in some of its judgments the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has 
emphasized the need to provide the complainant a fair and “structured” 
opportunity to comment until informal commitments (“undertakings” in UK 
competition law jargon) had been accepted, the CAT noting that although the 
commitment procedure does not envisage “an adversarial system”, “this does 
not preclude the need to afford the complainant an opportunity to defend its 
interests during the administrative proceedings” and that he is “given an 
opportunity to be heard before  the OFT (Office of Fair Trading) closes its file” 
and/or accepts the undertakings proposed107. 
 
The recent judgment of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal in Skyscanner v. 
CMA may provide some food for thought108. The CAT was seized on appeal 
to a decision adopted by the OFT, now replaced by the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA), accepting the commitments of some online travel 
agents and hotel groups by Skyscanner Limited, a third-party operating a 
price comparison website, also called “meta-search” site, assisting customers 
to compare pricing between various OTAs and hotels, with whom Skyscanner 
contracts for the inclusion of their offerings in its meta-search results. The 
main competition concern the commitments accepted by the OFT attempted 
to address concerned the restriction imposed in arrangements between the 
specific OTAs and the hotel groups to restrict each OTA’s ability to discount 
the rate at which room-only hotel accommodation bookings were offered to 
customers (the so called “price agreements”). The OFT also expressed some 
concerns with regard to some Most Favoured Nation clauses ensuring that 
the retail rates for hotel room bookings provided by hotels to OTAs were no 
less favourable than the lowest retail rate displayed by other distribution 
outlets (the so called “rate parity obligations), which the OFT found were 
capable of reinforcing the restriction of competition resulting from the 
discounting restrictions, although it did not consider if they could on their own 
be considered as a restriction of competition. The OFT accepted 
commitments by the parties, who agreed to remove the complete prohibition 
on discounting room-only rates and to replace these by limited discounting to 
“closed groups” of consumers, basically a membership group which 
consumers actively choose to join, up to the level of the commission or margin 
of OTAs. Although, according to the commitments, the OTAs could not 
publicise information about the specific level or extent of discounts outside the 
“closed group”, they could publicise information regarding the availability of 
discounts on their own websites or to price-comparison and meta-search 
websites. Skyscanner alleged that the OFT failed to take into account properly 
or at all its representations during the consultation (“market-testing”) process 
on the impact these commitment had on the meta-search sector on which 
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Skyscanner was active. Skyscanner expressed the concern that the 
commitments only focused on intra-brand competition, by allowing OTAs to 
offer discounts, but that allowing hotels to prevent OTAs from publicizing 
specific information about discounts to consumers outside the OTAs closed 
group, and hence to meta-search websites, had a negative effect on inter-
brand competition (and price-transparency for consumers), as consumers 
would be unable to use meta-search sites in order to compare the actual room 
prices and discounts offered by different hotels, the only information these 
meta-search websites would be able to provide being that discounts are 
available, but not the exact level of discounts.  
 
Of particular interest for our discussion is the allegation that the OFT violated 
the statutory duty of the OFT to consult and to consider representations made 
in response to its consultation notice. Despite the fact that the OFT had 
acknowledged the concerns expressed by Skyscanner and had even met with 
Skyscanner representatives to discuss these concerns, and the fact that 
Skyscanner was a “third party respondent to the consultation” and not a 
complainant in the OFT’s original investigation, the CAT found that the 
consultation process was “defective” as it had “failed conscientiously to 
address the objections raised” by Skyscanner and two other respondents to 
the consultation, which concerned the possible effect of the proposed 
commitments on price transparency and on meta-search websites109. The 
CAT noted that the fact that Skyscanner was a third-party, and not a 
complainant, should not affect “the significance the OFT would attach to a 
material point raised by a respondent”110, and that the demands made by the 
OFT to Skyscanner for further evidence as to the impact of the proposed 
commitments on the meta-search website sector or price transparency “was 
not acceptable”111. The CAT noted that the fact that the OFT was pursuing its 
investigation on the basis that it had identified a restriction “by object” may 
have deprived it “of the ability properly to appreciate the significance of the 
role of operators such as Skyscanner”, but this did not excuse the OFT from 
not investigating “a plausible point further”, before taking a decision, and, in 
any case, the OFT should not have insisted on more evidence or supporting 
material from Skyscanner itself on this point112. This finding was accompanied 
by some derogatory remarks of the CAT, raising the possibility that “the OFT 
found the Skyscanner objection inconvenient because it threated to upset a 
carefully constructed edifice that the OFT believed”113. Consequently, the CAT 
uphold Skyscanner’s appeal on this ground114. 
 
The Skyscanner judgment and the emphasis put by the CAT on the 
consultation process and the need to actively engage with the representations 
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made by third-parties illustrate the polycentric nature of commitment 
decisions. This specific nature calls for the consideration of the view (and 
interests) of all those affected by the decision, beyond the parties to the 
dispute. One cannot therefore apply the same principles as in the adjudicatory 
model. While conceptually distinct from the model of administrative 
management/regulation, the “structural model” of adjudication offers a more 
appropriate description of the hybrid nature of commitment decisions than the 
model of contractual governance. This has implications on the role and 
conceptualization of the consultation process, or of the intervention of the 
judiciary, among other issues, in order to guarantee the legitimacy of the 
decision-making process. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Left unbound, the principle of effectiveness may offer the opportunity to 
competition authorities to expand their remedial discretion and to re-design 
market processes and outcomes in accordance with the dominant 
interpretation of their statutory objectives. This may appear as a sound 
sacrifice of legal form in favour of “future-oriented” remedies that “lay down 
rules about how markets should behave in the future”115. The point made in 
this paper is that, whatever one thinks of the appropriateness of an expansive 
view of remedial discretion, which is not, in our view, supported by the 
restrictive interpretation of the principle of effectiveness in EU law, remedial 
discretion is naturally limited by the specific function exercised by the remedial 
process chosen or, more contentiously, imposed by the nature of the dispute. 
Drawing on Fuller’s account of the existence of various forms of social 
ordering, each of them emerging in specific circumstances/context and having 
its own principles and limitations, I offered some reflections on the possible 
limits that the essence of each ideal type of social ordering sets to the 
expansive interpretative potential of the principle of remedial effectiveness. 
For instance, the limits of adjudication are of different sort than those of 
contracts/negotiation or managerial/regulatory discretion. For each of these 
ideal types, legitimacy concerns operate differently and generate dissimilar 
demands on process or substantive rules bounding discretion. The polycentric 
nature of competition law disputes calls for flexibility in the choice of the 
adequate form of social ordering aiming to achieve the objectives set by the 
legislator. Its specificity also breaks with the classic view of the adjudication 
model and hints to the prevalence, in a significant number of cases with a 
pronounced polycentric element, of what has been called the “structural 
adjudication” model, still distinct from the model of regulatory governance. I 
discussed the nature of commitment decisions as an illustration of the 
difficulties of classification, without a proper consideration of the functions and 
respective limits of each form of social ordering. Commitment decisions have 
erroneously been characterized as closer to forms of contractual governance 
or, taking a starkly different perspective, to regulation. In reality these 
characterization disputes offer little and may be as confusing and un-
purposeful as discussions over the gender of angels, should one not develop 
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an overall theory on the meaning of each category and the practical 
implications of such categorization. This study aimed to sketch such theory by 
insisting on the need to keep an eye on the specific limitations to remedial 
discretion, of procedural or substantive nature, that have emerged in each 
form of social ordering with the aim to guarantee the legitimacy of decision-
making. It is not impossible for a competition authority to make the choice of 
one or the other form of social ordering, should it enjoy the power to perform 
such choice, if this is advancing its purpose. Yet, the authority should also 
adopt the mechanisms that were put in place in order to respond to the calls 
for the legitimacy of decision-making in the context of the specific type of 
social ordering. New tools, such as commitment decisions, which do not fit 
with existing categories, may require the development of new mechanisms or 
a different conceptualization of existing mechanisms in order to ensure the 
legitimacy of decision-making. This creative process is at presently ongoing in 
EU competition law. 
